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This study evaluates the impact of higher education reforms, implemented in the
early 1980s in Greece and Turkey, due to preceding student and wider political
radicalization, on academic freedom. It highlights a paradox, namely that
authoritarian corporatism in Turkey inadvertently facilitated academic freedom
in higher education, whereas in Greece participatory majoritarianism ended up
stiﬂing academic freedom. Authoritarian corporatism in Turkey mandated the
introduction of private universities. These expanded academic freedom within
the wider national goal of the country’s European Union membership. Participa-
tory majoritarianism in Greece conversely mandated student organisation partici-
pation in the governance of Greek higher education. These acquired powerful
rent-seeking interests, which have progressively constricted academic freedom.
Keywords: Greece; Turkey; academic freedom; higher education; private; public
Introduction
Student radicalization in the 1970s engendered opposite reactions in Greece and
Turkey. In Greece, it helped usher the transition to democracy in 1974, while in
Turkey it served as pretext for the 1980 military coup. These contrasting reactions
also engulfed the two countries’ respective university systems and governance
arrangements in due course. In Greece, the deﬁning thread of reforms in higher edu-
cation governance was that of participatory majoritarianism, in Turkey of authoritar-
ian corporatism. This paper will argue that paradoxically it was authoritarian
corporatism in Turkey that facilitated academic freedom in higher education,
whereas in Greece participatory majoritarianism ended up stiﬂing it.
For the purposes of our investigation, this study adopts the constitutive elements
of academic freedom identiﬁed by a survey of the concept relating to a template-
setting exercise in European higher education (Karran 2009, 169–70). These consti-
tutive elements comprise: (i) the freedom conferred to academics to pursue teaching,
research and the publication of the latter without outside hindrance imposed on
these activities, (ii) the freedom conferred to academics to pursue lines of inquiry
that challenge conventional wisdom, originate and partake in debate that can cause
umbrage and unpopularity, without fear that they might be deprived of their jobs
and the privileges attached to them.
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As it will be seen below, the aimed contribution of this paper would be to
expand and qualify this deﬁnition so as to incorporate, in the factors inimical to
academic freedom, not only speciﬁc higher education governance arrangements that
would either threaten or safeguard academics from exercising that sort of freedom,
but wider material and normative factors that could have the same effects. In that
respect, our investigation is a constructivist one, sensitive to both material interests
as well as ideational assumptions, which enjoy hegemonic power in the Greek and
Turkish polities within which the compared higher education systems are
ensconced. By doing so, this study challenges accounts that view either faculty par-
ticipation in university administration as a bulwark supporting academic freedom
(Vere 2007, 2) or student participation in academic affairs as engendering a consen-
sus which can facilitate and inform evolution in higher education undertaken by
academics (Menon 2003, 244). This study aims to utilize but also to extend the
reach of analyses, either general or pertaining to the Greek case that highlights the
effects of participation of such stakeholders as student unions as capable of promot-
ing gridlock, ﬁlibustering and rent-seeking in higher education, to the detriment of
academic freedom. In this respect, a key contribution of this study is the reafﬁrma-
tion of the need to examine institutional performance, and in particular the interac-
tion between governance and academic freedom in higher education, in a non-
formalistic way. Instead of taking into account the nominal and institutional charac-
teristics of higher education systems in determining whether they are conducive or
not to a particular feature of these systems, such as academic freedom, it is argued
that the material and normative characteristics of the polities and actors that are
capable of shaping higher education should be the focus of analysis. The eventual
outcomes of higher education reforms were directly contrary to the nominal and
perceived intent of the policy-makers which instituted these reforms, the comparison
and evolution of which is the subject matter of this paper. The wider utility, beyond
these two country cases of Greece and Turkey, will be to establish the case for a
qualitative, single-case approach in the examination of higher education systems
particularly in middle development countries, with a recent authoritarian tradition,
before attempting a quantitative analysis of this cohort.
Our research is also pertinent to the debate on the Arab Spring’s consequences
on higher education.1 In particular, the compromised position of academic leader-
ships, due to their regime afﬁliations, in such countries as Egypt and Tunisia, have
fuelled demands both for depoliticisation of higher education in these counties and
for greater student involvement in higher education governance. Reversely, the
recent growth of a private higher education segment in the region will also present
an enticing possibility for the use of this segment for the re-consolidation of politi-
cal docility in universities, particularly in Arab regimes which would end up suc-
cessful in repressing political rebellion. In the analysis that follows, both the Greek
and the Turkish case illuminate the potential outcomes of either one of these two
paths.
This study will commence with an evaluation of the origins and nature of higher
education reforms undertaken in Greece and Turkey in the early 1980s. These share
in common the attempt to address the expansion and concomitant radicalization of
these two higher education systems. The Greek effort sought to render sacrosanct
the idea of the university as an inviolate space, whereby Greek authorities such as
the police could only enter under the invitation of university authorities. Addition-
ally, students, the associational activities of whom were suppressed during the
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preceding seven-year rule of the military dictatorship, were given the right to co-
manage the university, up to and including the determination of when could Greek
police enter the university space, with the universities’ rectors and senates. The
Turkish effort was designed to de-radicalize the Turkish university, under the aus-
pices of the country’s military overseers. The Turkish reforms also introduced new
players, namely private benefactors that would set up universities of their own, but
within the context of the country’s authoritarian cum corporatist tradition, which
saw them as supporting pillars of the regime.
In the succeeding two decades, the 1990s and 2000s, which will be the focus of
this study, privately run universities in Turkey, sponsored mainly by the country’s
leading business families, coupled their academic freedom and self-governance with
the wider national goal of the country’s European Union (EU) accession process.
As such, they became citadels of a pluralistic discourse that would come to chal-
lenge the orthodoxies of the Turkish Republic, in terms both of its provenance and
its contemporary practice on such explosive issues as the treatment of minorities.
Consequently, Turkish higher education, and in particular its privately-run segment,
has made deﬁnitive advancements in the domain of academic freedom, in a polity
where democracy is not nearly as well consolidated as it is in Greece. By contrast
in Greece, higher education’s governance arrangements that confer decisive power
to political student organizations, sanctiﬁed as they have been in public discourse
by the student contribution to the 1974 democratic transition, have allowed for con-
tinuous and widespread disruption in the normal operations of the Greek university.
This has actually compromised academic freedom, the purported key objective of
the 1982 reforms.
The 1980s reforms: origins and outcomes
The case of Turkey
In Turkey, given that public universities had been leftist strongholds during the tur-
bulent 1960s and 1970s, the 1980–1983 military regime aimed to ‘depoliticize’
higher education, by bringing state universities under much more intrusive central
government control than hitherto had been the case. The relevant legal framework
was amended in 1981 whereby the Higher Education Council (Yüksek Öğretim
Kurulu [YÖK]) was resurrected and reconstituted as a national board of governors
responsible for the nomination of rector candidates and the appointment of deans.
Furthermore, the powers given to YÖK through the new legislation allowed for the
removal of hundreds of dissident faculty members from state universities. YÖK also
assumed extensive supervisory powers over curriculum development and all future
faculty appointments in the state university system in Turkey. Essentially, the
reformed YÖK became the tool for the re-imposition of ofﬁcial state ideology upon
universities. However, only one year later, in 1982, the constitutional stipulation set-
ting a state monopoly on higher education was lifted, and the establishment of pri-
vate non-proﬁt foundation (vakıf) universities became possible, despite initial
judicial opposition. Private foundations were allowed to establish universities, pro-
vided they are non-proﬁt, adequately endowed and that the standard of teaching and
research was no lower than that of public universities. What explains this – at least
on surface – contradiction between the military regime’s assertion of control over
higher education and contemporaneous liberalization?
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In fact, higher education reform – both by eliminating the autonomy of state
universities and enabling the creation of private ones, presumably enjoying greater
freedom of action than even state universities did prior to the institution of the all-
powerful YÖK – had a single aim: the emergence of a depoliticized tertiary sector
dedicated to Turkey’s developmentalist goals. The emergence of private higher edu-
cation institutions committed to Turkey’s economic development and loyal to the
regime’s ideology and vision posed additional pressure upon state universities
whose allegiance to ofﬁcial state ideology had been suspected. While state universi-
ties were losing their monopoly and were undergoing a major transformation, these
new private academic institutions were founded by corporate actors who were
assumed to be loyal and compliant with key regime goals. They were expected to
become bulwarks of the ofﬁcial state ideology and contribute to the realization of
its developmentalist orientation. This was an eminently realistic assumption, as,
within Turkey’s statist paradigm, and in an economy where corporate fortunes rose
and fell depending on their access and inﬂuence to the state and its functionaries,
any sort of civic activism undertaken by Turkey’s corporate families had to be
indisputably loyal to the Republic’s orthodoxy. Such fealty was institutionalized, as
these corporate actors, in the charitable foundations that they had established earlier
in the 1970s, took great pains to establish their regime-friendly credentials and
intentions, by appointing in their boards, key – if retired – ﬁgures from Turkey’s
bureaucratic and armed forces establishment (Singer 2008). Importantly, the univer-
sity reform prescribed a governance structure for the private universities premised
on powerful Boards of Trustees – as opposed to faculty self-governance – account-
able in turn to YÖK.
An increasing number of private universities were founded, and 62 of them
were operating in 2011, alongside 103 public universities. From them emerged
some of the leading academic institutions of Turkey, such as Bilkent University,
Sabancı University and Koç University, the latter two founded by the country’s two
biggest business conglomerates.
The reforms of 1982 – both in terms of state control through YÖK of state uni-
versities, putting limits to academic freedom and allowing the establishment of pri-
vate universities – essentially were and became part of a continuum, at least until
the mid-1990s, with the Turkish Republic’s authoritarian and corporatist character
(Küçükcan and Gür 2009, 137–40). This continuum actually predated the crisis of
the 1970s that brought them into being. Heper (1985) has pointed out how continu-
ous failure to reconcile Turkey’s cleavages, socio-economic, religious and ethnic
ones has renewed the mandate and ability of the state apparatus to act as an over-
seer over the political process. Özbudun 1991 and Bianchi (1984) have analysed
extensively how associational and civic life has been periodically subjected to state
intervention. More recently, Parla and Davinson (2004) have posited that Kemalism,
as a ‘third way’ ideology of authoritarian corporatism has endured in Turkish col-
lective life, delegitimizing any kind of collective or corporate action that does not
purport to serve the nation. The nation itself is perceived, in classic authoritarian
and corporatist terms, as an entity which is assumed to reconcile all class and sec-
tarian differences under its imperatives of modernization and progress – as opposed
to enabling the contestation and negotiation of these differences under democratic
politics.
Consequently, Turkey’s salient ﬁssures, across ethnic and cultural lines (the
issues of the Kurdish minority and subsequently of the place of religion in public
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life), exacerbated from the 1970s onwards, meant that the state continued to be hos-
tile to associational life and, by extension, to any sort of collective and civic action
that was, or could be seen to be, asserting particularistic claims (Heper 1985). Thus,
when the country’s industrial elite established its own association, Turk Sanayiciler
ve Isadamlari Dernegi-Turkish Industrialists’ and Businesspersons’ Association
(TÜSİAD), in 1971, it had to couch its rationale in recognizable Kemalist discourse,
which is in terms of aiming to contribute to Turkey’s attainment of contemporary
standards of civilization and afﬂuence – rather than just to defending the legitimate
interests of leading economic actors (Özbudun 1991).
Clamping down on the autonomy of the state university, when that autonomy
was seen as incubating ideological clashes and national division, as in left and right
violent confrontations across Turkish campuses in the 1970s, was, in the light of
the above, eminently legitimate state action in pursuit of the national interest. This
national interest ordained both the paciﬁcation of Turkish state campuses and the
unhindered production of an educated cadre of technocrats that the nation continued
to need for its uninterrupted advancement. Likewise, enlisting in this effort, Turkish
business families and corporations, which were perceived to be loyal, enhanced the
impact of control of the state university sector both quantitatively and qualitatively,
as these newly founded institutions, well-endowed and efﬁcient, could function as
exemplars for their brethren – well integrated, predictable institutional pillars of
Turkey’s authoritarian corporatism. In sum, student radicalization in the 1970s and
the wider ﬁssures that it represented in Turkish society contributed to the reassertion
of Turkey’s authoritarian corporatism. Turkey’s state elites considered that the
founding of private universities would serve the national imperative for a depoliti-
cized while advanced Turkish tertiary sector.
The case of Greece
In Greece, the ﬁrst reform effort of higher education after the collapse of the mili-
tary regime in 1974 was undertaken by the centre-right New Democracy (Nea
Dimokratia [ND]) party in 1975–1976 and incorporated in Law 309/1976. ND
sought to modernize education by enhancing its capacity both to create a demo-
cratic citizenship and an educated workforce that could prosper within the European
Economic Community (Persianis 1998). Still, these reforms were denounced by the
left, most prominently by the rising centre-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK) and Greece’s Communist Party (Kommounistiko Komma Ellados -
Communist Party of Greece [KKE]). They were portrayed as seeking to create a
compliant workforce, preserve existing socio-economic distinctions and maintain
Greece’s international orientation as a loyal client state of the West and the USA in
particular (Kazamias 1978). Actually, these criticisms echoed student protests and
rhetoric during the dictatorship, culminating in the 1973 student ‘Polytechnio’ revolt
against the Greek dictatorship’s attempt to reform the university system along apo-
litical technocratic lines (Kornetis 2006, 178–9), just as the Evren regime did in the
1980s. From that perspective, the educational template that prevailed in Turkey in
the 1980s, premised as it was on aggressive de-politicization and the acquisition of
technocratic knowledge, ﬁtted much better with this critique of the Greek left than
the ND efforts which sought to balance – if imperfectly – both egalitarian and tech-
nocratic priorities. In addition, ND purged in 1975 the educational system of its
most prominent dictatorship-era personalities. In retrospect, that would not be
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enough but rather a change in governance of the Greek universities would also be
implemented once the left came into power in 1981. In particular, with PASOK
becoming government in 1981, modernization and efﬁciency priorities would be
compromised as obstacles to radical changes in the governance of higher education.
The PASOK government saw the university as a key democratization lever
(Grollios and Kaskaris 2003). The university was seen as a place where democracy
must be entrenched, as opposed to being violated, as it happened when the junta
violently suppressed student demonstrations in 1973, if it were to address the
national imperative for social equity and an emancipated popular will. Thus, Law
1268/82 enacted by PASOK provided for joint faculty and student-elected govern-
ing bodies, making it impossible for university rectors to be elected without the
support of the voting blocs delivered by student political organizations. This meant
that, henceforth, the Greek university would be essentially governed by alliances
between faculty trade unions and the major student political organizations. These
would elect the rectors accommodating their concerns and, by extension, those of
the government which, in the case of PASOK in the 1980s, enjoyed strong repre-
sentation with both groupings. As in Turkey, the institutional creation of a stake-
holder, in this case the political student organizations, was meant to overwhelm the
university establishments’ perceived ideological opposition to the government of the
day – albeit in Greece, the ideological roles were reversed with the Greek professo-
riate being seen as politically conservative.
This was part of an overall effort, undertaken by PASOK at the time, to
encroach participatory democracy in all corporate entities of note, including state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and signiﬁcant non-proﬁt institutions. Legislation which
mandated the participation of unions in the management boards of strategic SOEs
spoke of serving ‘the national interest and the social whole’ (Papoulias and Lioukas
1995), of integrating SOEs in the wider struggle against Greece’s domestic political
and economic elite and its western patrons. The experience of the junta and the
1974 Cyprus crisis made the dominance of the popular will, expressed by the gov-
erning party in Greece’s majoritarian parliamentary system, a supreme and unfet-
tered goal to the point of intolerance to the voices of non-elected bodies, or to
bodies governed through seniority and merit, as opposed through explicitly majori-
tarian outcomes (Voulgaris 2001).
Within this general thrust of ‘socializing the state’, the state university enjoyed a
commanding position as: (i) the student movement was seen as a key factor behind
the junta’s collapse, and as the carrier of national will due to the lack of resistance
to the regime by any other organized forces, (ii) key PASOK personnel were actu-
ally members of the ‘Polytechnio generation’ having participated in the uprising
against the junta and (iii) being seen as representing the demands of this generation,
PASOK could legitimately claim to represent the left and its aspirations in Greece
at a time when the centre-right had become discredited and was seen as being on
the losing side of history. Last but not least, all of these three factors acquired fur-
ther weight as they were mediated by the natural claim of the academic community
to provide intellectual leadership to Greek society.
PASOK’s novel direction, as in the case of Turkey, powerfully interacted with
an existing tradition in favour of the state being in command of education (Aliviza-
tos 2007). The Greek constitution, long before PASOK came to power, had deﬁned
education as a core public good akin to public order and defence from the provision
of which the state cannot abscond. This political tradition has been constitutionally
140 I.N. Grigoriadis and A. Kamaras
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
5:1
0 1
5 J
uly
 20
14
 
encapsulated and maintained through Article 16, revised in the democratic constitu-
tion of 1975, which the centre-right ND introduced in Parliament. This article man-
dates that the provision of education is a core state mission and that such state-
provided education must serve the needs of inculcating the Greek national and citi-
zenship consciousness. The same article prohibits the operation of institutions of
higher education by private actors. In the parliamentary discussions, on the revised
Article 16, both the then PASOK leader, Andreas Papandreou, and inﬂuential
PASOK deputies argued for even stronger provisions, in the direction of extending
the state monopoly in education to the secondary level and denying any foreigners
or non-Greek bodies a role in the provision of education in Greece.
Article 16, although not voted by PASOK, by reafﬁrming the state monopoly in
higher education, under PASOK’s rule came to serve the imperative for a dominant
and unquestioned paradigm in Greek higher education, albeit in the service of a rad-
icalized, left-leaning nation. The innovation that PASOK introduced through Law
1268/82 was to exercise this control through the participation of student organiza-
tions and faculty trade unions. PASOK, thus, simply continued this tradition, albeit
within the contours of democratic majoritarianism, and student organizations implic-
itly endorsed it, although seeking to absorb it to their own worldview, a premise
inherently inimical to pluralism. As it will become clear below, the effect was to
compromise the other two goals articulated under the revision of Article 16 in
1975, namely the full self-governance of universities and the unhindered exercise of
academic freedom.
To sum up, in both Greece and Turkey, subsequent to student radicalization in
the 1970s a major novel actor in university governance is introduced, the student
movement in the case of Greece, private interests in the case of Turkey. In both
Greece and Turkey, these new actors are seen as buttressing key regime goals; in
Greece the conﬁrmation and consolidation of the majority will, in Turkey the stabil-
ization of the country and its re-dedication to its developmentalist purpose. These
two commonalities, in both countries, much as they signal change they also under-
line continuity whereby the university, as a repository and diffuser of knowledge, is
under indisputable national control and is aligned with national purpose.
Higher education governance and academic freedom
The case of Turkey
After the economic liberalization programme of the Özal administration, the market
opening mandated by Turkey’s Association Agreement with the EU and the 1989
collapse of the Berlin Wall, Turkey’s conglomerates were facing increasing competi-
tion at home from western European manufacturers and service providers. They also
faced increasing competition, in western European markets, from manufactures from
Central Eastern Europe, who availed themselves of the policy and macroeconomic
stability, as well as the transfers which was the outcome of their status as pre-acces-
sion countries in the EU (Öniş and Türem 2002). Turkey’s massive 2001 macroeco-
nomic crisis powerfully underlined this necessity for an EU-induced governance
and stability to Turkey’s business elite. At the same time the positive reception of
Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership status by international investors cemented
the link between a wider transformation of Turkey’s polity, including democratiza-
tion, and the ability of Turkey’s conglomerates to survive and prosper in increas-
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ingly competitive home and international markets (Mousseau Yalcin 2006; Öniş and
Bakır 2007). It was not that privileged access and carrying favour with the Turkish
state were no longer important but rather that they were no longer sufﬁcient to the
strategic interests and orientation of Turkey’s largest corporate holdings. As a result,
they became increasingly willing to propose and vigorously defend changes in the
Turkish polity that were anathema to the country’s bureaucratic and military estab-
lishment (Yavuz 2010). Thus, this business class now challenged bureaucratic elites
in terms of the deﬁnition of Turkish national interest, in the context of Turkey’s EU
vocation. As their Kemalist and corporatist credentials were impeccable, they were
able to credibly propose alternative deﬁnitions of the national interest and the estab-
lishment of a pluralist public sphere. Overall, TÜSİAD, just as its early years in the
1970s, argued that its existence seeks to serve the common good – the difference
being that by the 1990s it was willing and capable to disagree with Turkey’s
bureaucratic elite on what this good consisted of and on how it could be best pur-
sued. Speciﬁcally, the Turkish corporate elite through its association, TÜSİAD, has
claimed to speak of the national interest, not the class one, when it speaks of com-
pliance to the EU. The TÜSİAD Report on Democratization signalled this willing-
ness, on the part of business groups, to claim a leadership position within Turkey’s
corporatist hierarchy. The report was one of the most important policy documents
of the late 1990s, which heralded the beginning of Turkey’s most important political
reform process challenging the ideological foundations of the country’s Kemalist
regime (Tanör 1997). The key desiderata proposed by this report were civilian con-
trol of the military, respect of minority rights and freedom of speech.
Turkey’s private universities, some of the most prominent of which have been
founded by TÜSIAD members, have strongly complemented TÜSİAD’s stance by
actively engaging in the ideological debates, which have characterized Turkey’s pol-
itics since the late 1990s. Importantly they did so in the face of intense opposition
both from the country’s state establishment and extremist groups. As such, they
became citadels of a discourse that would come to challenge the orthodoxies of
republican Turkey, in terms both of its provenance and its contemporary practice on
such explosive issues as the treatment of ethnic minorities. Through the establish-
ment of faculties of humanities and social sciences, they were able to put forward
an agenda of political pluralism which was viewed as necessary for Turkey’s demo-
cratic consolidation.
Through the critical support of some private universities, taboo issues have been
openly discussed for the ﬁrst time. The 1915 Armenian massacres are a prime
example. The 2005 conference on the Armenian issue, organized in Istanbul by
three prominent universities, Bogaziçi, Sabancı and Bilgi University, the latter two
of which are private, was a prime example for this. This conference, which hosted
all opinions on one of Turkey’s most sensitive issues, met with ﬁerce reaction by
nationalist media, bureaucrats and politicians. Although it had to be postponed
once, due to mounting pressure and threats, the conference eventually took place in
September 2005. It allowed for the expression of all academic views on the Arme-
nian issue, including those which opposed the ofﬁcial Turkish narrative and trig-
gered an unprecedented public debate on one of the most controversial topics of
late Ottoman history. It also underlined the linkage between pluralism in governance
arrangements and pluralism in expression. Bogaziçi, Turkey’s leading elite state uni-
versity, seen by many as enjoying relative, to other state peers, immunity from state
intervention due to its privileged connections with the country’s bureaucratic elite,
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many of whom count themselves as its alumni, was actually compelled by state
interference to give up its designation as the venue for the conference on the
Armenian Genocide. It was the private Bilgi University’s willingness to take the
baton that allowed the conference to take place.
In addition, private Turkish universities fostered academic research of non-Turk-
ish civilizations in Anatolia. The study of ancient Greek, Byzantine and Armenian
civilizations have never enjoyed the support of Turkey’s state institutions. In line
with the policies of several nation-states, Turkish authorities preferred not to support
academic research on culture, art and history that were not classiﬁed as ‘national’.
Such research would highlight the multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural heri-
tage of Anatolia, the assumed heartland of the Turkish Republic, and would alleg-
edly undermine Turkish nationalist claims on Anatolia. Private universities run
counter to this predilection, for a nationalist narrative by the Turkish state. The
establishment of a well-endowed Research Center for Anatolian Civilizations
(RCAC) by Koç University signalled increased interest in the study of non-Turkish
civilizations of Anatolia. The mission statement of the RCAC identiﬁed, among its
targets, to: (i) increase the awareness of the contributions and interactions Anatolian
civilizations have had with other major world civilizations and (ii) develop and pro-
vide an educational forum in Turkey that focuses on current practices of interna-
tional cultural heritage and museum studies. In view of these founding charter
goals, the RCAC supported research on the ancient Greek, Byzantine, Armenian,
Assyrian art, history, archaeology heritage of Anatolia, alongside the Seljuk and
Ottoman.2 The organization of a conference on ‘Contemporary Perceptions of
Byzantium’ at Kadir Has University in November 2009 was another important
example. While the organization of an academic conference on the Byzantine
Empire was a novelty in itself, it was even more noteworthy that the opening lec-
ture for the conference was given by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the primus
inter pares ecclesiastical leader for hundreds of millions of Orthodox Christians
worldwide. This was a rare honour by a Turkish institution to the Patriarch, given
the refusal of the Turkish authorities to recognize the Patriarch as anything else but
the spiritual leader of Turkey’s dwindling Greek Orthodox minority.
Moreover, private universities played a leading role in the promotion and facili-
tation of EU reform. While Turkey entered a new phase in its relations with the EU
in 1999 and the prospect of EU membership looked more realistic than ever, private
universities acted as reform catalysts. The establishment of European studies centres
in several private universities (e.g. Bilgi University, Sabancı University and Bah-
çeşehir University) has contributed to the dissemination of European political ideals,
as well as public advocacy of the reform process. Several seminars and conferences
were organized in cooperation with European and US academic and policy institu-
tions on issues such as democratization, human rights, the Kurdish issue, EU–Tur-
key relations and the role of media in democratization. Policy initiatives included
issues as sensitive as education3 and justice.
Public involvement also included the mass media. Numerous faculty members
of private universities undertook the role of public intellectual by becoming regular
contributors to mainstream media, print and electronic. The creation of these ‘safe
havens’ of academic freedom comprised a critical achievement of Turkish business
groups. It led to the enrichment of the public discourse, a critical element of Tur-
key’s democratic consolidation. The contribution of private higher education to the
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rise of a more pluralist public sphere can also be evaluated in contrast to incidents
which manifest shortcomings in academic freedom within several state universities.
Secularist attempts to remove any traces of political Islam from the Turkish pub-
lic sphere following the 1997 ‘soft’ coup and the resignation of Turkey’s ﬁrst Islam-
ist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan were also reﬂected in state university
campuses. In March 2000, the rectorate of the state Inönü University in the eastern
city of Malatya launched a purge operation of any books with Islamist content from
the university library and the special library collection of the history department.
The list of books withdrawn due to their suspected Islamist content included the
world bestseller Sophie’s World: A Novel about the History of Philosophy and all
books in Arabic and Persian language. These books were eventually reinstated in
the university library as they were found to have no Islamist leanings (Küçükcan
and Gür 2009, 175–6). Yet academic freedom and pluralism were not.
Another clear example was the persecution of faculty members of state universi-
ties who expressed views against the mainstream. Prof. Atilla Yayla of Ankara’s
state Gazi University participated on 18 August 2006 in a panel on democratic
reform organized in Izmir by the governing Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and
Development Party’s (AKP’s) local youth organization (Yayla 2006). In his remarks,
Yayla disputed the democratic and progressive credentials of early republican
Kemalism. On the following day, a piece appeared in the local Izmir newspaper
Yeni Asır, calling Yayla a ‘traitor’ for these comments. The issue was immediately
taken over by Turkey’s national media which raised a nationwide campaign against
Yayla and his statements. Soon the government party AKP disowned him and his
statements, and disciplinary procedures were launched against him at Gazi Univer-
sity. Prof. Yayla was suspended from his faculty post, while the Izmir prosecutor
ﬁled a case against him on the grounds of ‘insulting Ataturk and his memory’.
The consolidation of academic freedom within private universities was symboli-
cally underlined through a confrontation over the founder of republican Turkey.
One of Turkey’s leading private universities, Sabancı University, had long attracted
the ire of nationalist groups for years due to its failure to erect an Ataturk monu-
ment in its campus, like any other Turkish university (Aşık 2005). In November
2005, members of the youth organization of the extreme-left nationalist Workers’
Party (İşçi Partisi) invaded the campus and protested the alleged anti-Ataturk poli-
cies of Sabancı University. They left only after leaving a bust of Ataturk in front of
the university rectorate building. The university administration issued a public state-
ment that ‘despite these malevolent efforts and claims, our university will continue
to follow Ataturk’s path and educate liberal individuals defending university
autonomy, knowledge and freedom of expression’. A few months later, an Ataturk
monument was ﬁnally erected within the Sabancı University campus. Yet this mon-
ument differed greatly from its equivalents. It did not consist of a statue or bust of
Ataturk but a handwritten statement of his on the question of pluralism:
I am not leaving any dogma, any frozen, moulded principle as moral legacy. My
moral legacy is knowledge and reason.
Last but not least, the contribution of academic freedom within private to the
enlargement of the space of open public discourse was also manifested through
Internet access. Based on the laws which ban the smearing of Kemal Ataturk, Turk-
ish courts have repeatedly banned popular Internet sites such as YouTube which
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contained allegedly illegal content. At times, banning the YouTube would also mean
limitations to the access of several Google services. This situation put Turkey to the
rather unhappy position of sharing a seat with China, Iran and Syria in the list of
states imposing severe limitations to the use of Internet (Jones 2010). Yet several
private Turkish universities appeared to circumvent the problem. By establishing
direct links with their international Internet providers, they could escape limitations
of Turkish courts. Hence, websites banned throughout Turkey remained accessible
inside the campuses of private universities, such as Sabancı and Bilkent University.
The case of Greece
In Greece, during the same period of the 1990s and 2000s, when the 1982 reform
became bedded down and its consequences were entrenched, one can observe – as
in Turkey – the growing autonomy of the actor introduced by the reform in the
governance of higher education, namely student organizations. Contrary to the
Turkish experience, however, this growing autonomy has undermined the ability of
the Greek university to protect and extend academic freedom.
The two main and interdependent governance features of Greece’s higher
education have developed as follows. First, the creation of a powerful rent-seeking
coalition composed of student organizations, mainly Panellinia Agonistiki
Spoudastiki Parataxi-Panhellenic Militant Students Group (PASP) and Dimokratiki
Ananeotiki Protoporia-Democratic Renewal and Innovation (DAP), which are linked
to Greece’s two main parties, the centre-left PASOK and centre-right ND, and
university rectors and other faculty, elected to lead universities, schools and depart-
ments, and who depend on their election on the bloc votes delivered by student
organizations.4 Second, the emergence of the Greek university as a sui generis
anomic institutional space with university authorities often neglecting their account-
ability for the management of personnel and ﬁnancial resources, to Greek courts
and state auditing authorities, and the ability of the Greek police and prosecutorial
authorities to forestall, contain and prosecute common law crimes, such as the exer-
cise of physical violence, theft, vandalism, drugs peddling, likewise being minimal.
Rent-seeking in Greek higher education, at its most fundamental, is a clientelis-
tic transaction whereby the university authorities would grant to their clients – the
student organizations who deliver their votes and get them elected in positions of
authority – favours in exchange for votes. For the student organizations as voters,
such favours include, indicatively, easy to manage exam schedules, less than
demanding curricula on which these exams are based, passing grades, preferential
access to postgraduate studies. For the students as organization leaders, in addition
to the above-enumerated favours, the management of this transaction facilitates their
careers, as they can secure fast-track advancement in one of Greece’s political par-
ties to which these student organizations are afﬁliated with. For faculty who engage
on the other side of this transaction, other than the social goods of power over
colleagues and societal recognition, the elevation to a position of authority with the
indispensable help of student organizations provides privileged access to ﬁnancial
resources and – in some cases – signiﬁcant opportunities for personal enrichment.
Student organizations also have the ability, which they systematically employ, to
physically intervene5 – even to the point of exercising violence – to derail the
proceedings of the university’s governing bodies and of university life, at large,
through occupations of academic buildings and the disruption of lectures and
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conferences, under de facto impunity granted to them by ‘asylum provisions’
inscribed in law. This ability is a critical adjunct to the power of political student
organizations, as it is used to: (i) threaten and/or exercise violence as a tool to
enhance their power and inﬂuence over university authorities and (ii) impose the
ideological conformity within the university space, which is critical to the legitima-
tion of their own power. University authorities do not, in the main, challenge the
concept and operationalisation of the university as an ‘asylum’ ﬁrst and foremost
because it is highly prized by their key constituents, the student organizations that
elect them. However, they have a direct vested interest of their own not to do so.
The concept of ‘asylum’ maintains the legitimacy of the claim that universities are
unique in Greece in their entitlement to ignore or resist supervision and sanction by
state authorities and judicial organs, even when such supervision and sanction are
solidly grounded in the country’s legal order. By safeguarding this legitimacy, rec-
tors, university senates and departments leaderships are better able to arbitrarily
manage academic and administrative affairs, particularly when these involve their
particularistic self-interests.
As far as the impact on academic freedom is concerned, out of these two inter-
acting modalities, of the university governed by a rent-seeking coalition between
student organizations and faculty, and the university as an ‘asylum’, i.e. enjoying
immunity from the Greek administrative and legal order, three main factors can be
identiﬁed. First, the vulnerability that the state university exhibits, as the rent-seek-
ing coalition that maintains in existence the asylum provisions, discourages pluralis-
tic debate within the university, as they offer no protection to individuals and
initiatives that would express views, which offend the sensibility of student organi-
zations and/or other student factions of whatever ilk. Second, the limitations placed
on university faculty to develop their curriculum in a way they see ﬁt and in accor-
dance with the advancements of the relevant academic disciplines. Third, the need
to forestall the creation of a non-state university sector not least so that the ideolog-
ical hegemony that sustains this rent-seeking coalition would remain unchallenged
by the existence and operation of such institutions.
One can now examine these three factors that undermine pluralism in greater
detail. Asylum provisions are not only exploited by student organizations that are
partaking in the rent-seeking coalition but also by other student organizations and
informal factions that want to promote an ideological agenda, which is independent
of rent-seeking. Neither student organizations nor the departmental leaderships, uni-
versity senates and rectors with which they rule the universities have an interest in
challenging this latter category, however, as these more radicalized student factions,
mostly found in the extreme left but also in the extreme right, drink from the same
wellspring of legitimacy, namely the notion of the university as an inviolate, almost
under any circumstances, space, as far as the Greek police and prosecutorial author-
ities are concerned.
Pluralistic expression has consequently suffered from the systematic disruption of
visiting lectures and conferences considered provocative to the mores of the domi-
nant left-wing political student associations and due to the fact that faculty, in a self-
censorship mode, would eschew the pursuit of such activities that would realistically
be expected to provoke student ire and ultimately violence (Alivizatos 2007). Indica-
tive of this tenor of Greek academic life have been the cancellation, after political
student organization pressure, of a research programme undertaken by a professor of
psychology at the University of Thessaloniki in 1988, due to misleading accusations
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by student organizations that it was sponsored by North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the interruption of a lecture on human rights violations in communist East-
ern Europe at the University of Macedonia in 2001 and the break-up of a debate,
with invited speakers being critical of the asylum provisions and practice, at Pante-
ion University (Kampylis 2009). Although such disruption and violence have pre-
dominantly originated from left-leaning groups, they have by no means monopolized
it, as the lack of essential order within campuses has been ﬁlled by groups across the
ideological spectrum. Far-right groups have also stormed conferences which
explored issues related to minority rights violations in Greece. One of the most
recent examples was the interruption of a conference on the Chams at Panteion Uni-
versity in February 2008. All in all, violence directed against pluralistic expression
within the Greek university indeed covers a wide ideological spectrum. However,
the enabling source of this violence is the unwillingness of the universities’ key
stakeholders, its elected authorities and student organizations, to qualify the concept
of asylum, which underpins their own institutional dominance. Our second factor,
constraints imposed on curriculum development by student organizations, is particu-
larly pronounced in Greece’s older universities, which are geared towards employ-
ment in the public sector (Pesmazoglu 1994). In these universities, more than 75%
of the graduates historically have sought employment in the state sector, thus curric-
ulum did not need to incorporate disciplinary advancements that would impart mar-
ketable skills and know-how and/or sophisticated analytical skills to university
graduates. Through this nexus of politicization and patronage, student organizations
have undertaken to negotiate a narrow – textbook-based – curriculum and to take
exams on an ever smaller sliver of this material and a convenient exam schedule to
students affecting teaching programmes. Student organizations have bargained suc-
cessfully to introduce curriculum changes and have often compelled faculty to give
out pass grades to failing students. The concrete aim of having faculty engage in
‘facilitating’ students, Pesmazoglou notes, was ‘given an ideological undertone: the
catchword for years was against “intensiﬁcation” of studies … against strenuous
efforts’ (Pesmazoglu 1994, 295). This was due to the fact that ‘the whole vocabulary
of modernization, innovation, and adaptation of academic curriculum was automati-
cally linked in the period of radicalization with capitalist and imperialist exploitation
and anti European attitude prevailing up to the mid 1980s was its logical outcome’
(Pesmazoglu 1994, 295). Pesmazoglu’s ﬁndings have also been extensively corrobo-
rated by Greek press reports since (Koutsogianni 2010). By contrast, in Turkey, as
noted above, a corollary of the alignment of the founders of private universities with
the country’s goal of EU accession, has accelerated curriculum advancement particu-
larly in the humanities and the social sciences.
Moving on to the third factor forestalling academic freedom in Greek universi-
ties for student organizations, the university authorities and, in this case, the faculty
trade union, Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Didaktikou kai Erevnitikou
Prosopikou-Panhellenic Federation of Academic and Research Staff Associations
(POSDEP), a critical goal has been to derail the introduction of competition in
higher education. This could be aimed either through the revision of Article 166 or
by granting professional rights to the operating private colleges in Greece, which
have a franchise or other partnership arrangements, with third-country institutions
of higher learning based in EU member country domiciles.7 Such competition
would diminish the rent-seeking coalition’s claim on resources, as a growing
percentage of Greek students would be directed to institutions with governance
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arrangements that would not confer the same kind of leverage and control that fac-
ulty and student organizations have at the state universities, and could, potentially,
become a template for a reform of governance arrangements in the state university
system itself. This alliance has been rendered particularly effective by the threat or
actual exercise of in-campus violence, which enjoys impunity,8 as well as the threat
of off-campus protests. Such violence has been used strategically, particularly dur-
ing the parliamentary debates, which were supposed to lead to revision of Article
16, which would have ended the state monopoly in higher education. Illuminatingly,
the perspective of a pluralistic higher education in Greece, activated by the ND Kar-
amanlis government of 2004–2009, in its effort to revise Article 16, was delegiti-
mized by the spectre of involvement in education of business interests. The debate
was framed by leftist parties, but also most eminent centre-left personalities origi-
nating from the university, who not only argued that the amendment of Article 16
aims at the commercialization of higher education and at undermining the principle
that education is a public good but also at facilitating private actors, through the
control of institutions of higher education, to alter Greece’s ideological make-up.
The idea that the university should privilege a particular ideological outlook as
opposed to another, via the maintenance of a particular governance arrangement,
which is hypothesized to enjoy majoritarian legitimation, goes to the heart of our
analysis. It underlines the assessment of the actors involved in the governance of
higher education in Greece that the survival of the rent-seeking coalition which they
have fashioned over time is contingent upon the status of the state university as a
monopoly provider of higher education. Only this monopoly status of the state uni-
versity can keep in being the historical and ideological origins – those of the 17
November 1973 rebellion against the junta – that provide immunity to the rent-
seeking coalition from increased accountability from the Greek state and society.
Inevitably, the preservation of these origins, in the foundations of the Greek state
university, also privileges a particular ideological outlook and is thus inimical to
academic freedom and pluralistic expression in general.
The fact that DAP, the centre-right student organization, is itself a major stake-
holder in many universities in this rent-seeking coalition does not qualify our under-
standing. The reason is that DAP has partaken the rent-seeking beneﬁts legitimized
by a leftist ideological tradition in Greece (indeed not unlike trade unions associated
with ND and powerful in state-controlled enterprises and the civil service) and has
been rest content to abstain from the debate itself. Its autonomy as an actor, however,
and those of the faculty that base their own power within Greece’s various universi-
ties through their alliance with DAP, as opposed to PASOK’s PASP, has been testi-
ﬁed by the fact that during ND’s reign in government, it pressed the government not
to dilute student participation in the election of university authorities.9 In that
respect, DAP has reﬂected its mother party, which has been mostly content to accept
the ideological hegemony established by PASOK, in the 1980s and 1990s. In effect
DAP, while paying lip service to supposed ideological and policy distinctions with
PASP, actually partakes in similar rent-seeking coalitions to those that PASP, and its
mother party PASOK’s, ideological hegemony, has given shape to overtime.
Conclusions
In both Greece and Turkey, major political transitions at opposite directions towards
democratization and authoritarianism, respectively, re-afﬁrmed enduring statist
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traditions by denying autonomy to the existing universities and strengthening state
control. This was aimed in Turkey through the institution of YÖK and in Greece
through the maintenance of the state monopoly in higher education in combination
with the participation of party-afﬁliated student organizations in rector elections.
These regulatory innovations and continuities were contextualized by the primacy
of the polity, the authoritarian, tutelary in Turkey, the democratic, majoritarian one
in Greece, which mandated the mission of the university: technocratic development
in Turkey, democratization and unhindered majority rule in Greece. In neither coun-
try was it considered legitimate and desirable that universities exercise autonomy to
pursue their mission whether this mission was to be deﬁned by the polity or by
other social and economic stakeholders. In Turkey, however, private universities
were allowed to come into being but at a time when their founders, Turkey’s busi-
ness families, were both dependent on the authoritarian state and seen as loyal par-
ticipants in the project of building a stable, authoritarian and modern Turkish state
and economy.
In a dynamic process, both in Greece and in Turkey, the capacity of stakeholders
to use governance arrangements, granted to them by the state, to suit their own evolv-
ing needs and aims, and employing to this task leverage they did not possess, at the
time when these governance arrangements were ﬁrst instituted, played itself out, with
contrasting results for academic freedom. In Turkey, the founders of private universi-
ties availed themselves of their greater credibility and declining dependence on the
state, together with the emergence of a national goal which was conformable with
their strategic imperative, namely EU accession, to challenge the ideological primacy
and power motives of the bureaucratic elites that ﬁrst opened the doors of higher edu-
cation to them. While business groups as founders and owners of academic institu-
tions are usually considered as obstacles to academic freedom, they have contributed
to the latter’s reinforcement in Turkey. In Greece, the rent-seeking prowess and the
motives that materialized due to rent-seeking led a powerful coalition of political stu-
dent organizations, faculty trade unions and the university leaderships that they jointly
promoted, to undermine academic freedom. Intolerance towards the expression of
views in the university deemed hostile to student organizations and/or factions, curric-
ulum stagnation and the suppression of governance reform of the state university and
the emergence of competing governance arrangements in Greek higher education,
which would not be under the ideological and administrative control of the rent-
seeking coalition, have been the consequences.
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Notes
1. Indicatively see (Altbach 2011) and (Mazawi 2011).
2. In an interesting contrast, the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations in Ankara hosted only
items from those Anatolian Civilizations which could not be claimed by competing
nationalisms, Phrygian, Hittite and Urartu art.
3. An example of this was the education reform initiative (ERI), a project launched within
the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabanci University with the aim to improve education pol-
icy and decision-making through research, advocacy and monitoring. ERI is committed
to quality K-12 education for all.
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4. The collusion between student organisation and university authorities received scholarly
attention subsequent to the 1982 reform and up to currently, see indicatively Grant
(1986, 17–31), Pesmazoglu (1994).
5. Similarly, the routine disruption of academic proceedings, conferences and lectures has
also been widely discussed in the Greek press. Indicatively, Lakasas (2009).
6. On the question of Article 16, also see Psacharopoulos (2003).
7. POSDEP, rectors, student organizations and the parties of the Greek communist parties,
KKE and Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras-Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA),
have formed an alliance to resist – successfully – the repeal of Article 16. Indicatively,
see Mandravelis (2006).
8. POSDEP’s previous leadership, which intensely interacted with student organizations to
derail the reforms of higher education by the ND government, has argued that the man-
agement of asylum provisions – which determine whether universities would call or not
the police to quell disturbances, violence or even criminality – should not be the prov-
ince only of rectors but should continue to be co-determined with student representa-
tives, see Apekis (2007).
9. This was related to one of the two authors in spring 2006 by an advisor to the then
Greek prime minister, Constantine Karamanlis.
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